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1. Introduction
There are many similarities between the provision of artificial hydration and
nutrition ("AHN") and the provision of artificial respiration ("AR"). Many
ethicists cite these similarities in support of the conclusion that the provision of
AHN for a patient diagnosed as permanently unconscious ("DPU patient")! is
always morally optional.
Such conclusion regarding AHN is not persuasive to the extent it relies on the
analogy to AR. Even if an individual's moral obligation to use food and water is
evaluated in terms of the same principles applicable to the use of other medical
treatments, such principles do not establish that the use of AR for nondying
DPU patients is always morally optional and, therefore, they do not establish
that the provision of AHN to nondying DPU patients is always morally
optional.
.
In this paper I first review some of the literature wherein authors expressly
compare AHN and AR. The views of those who consider AHN and AR morally
and medically indistinguishable and those who consider AHN and AR
fundamentally different are discussed.
Next, the validity ofthese two views is tested by a case involving each type of
treatment. 2 The Karen Quinlan case is revisited as a vehicle for refining the
ethical analysis of AR. The Nancy Cruzan case is used as a tool for studying the
principles involving AHN. The study of these two cases enables us to draw
certain conclusions regarding the principles governing the prolongation oflife as
they apply to DPU patients and the particular procedures of AR and AHN.
2. Literature on AHN and AR: Similarities and Differences
Cases over the last decade or so involving the withdrawal of AHN from DPU
patients have forced ethicists to analyze the traditional principles regarding the
prolongation of life in light of new circumstances. The development

48

Linacre Quarterly

of artificial methods of respiration necessitated a reassessment of the ethical
obligations of individuals in the face of such new technology. Pope Pius XII's
1957 Address to Anesthesiologists and the case of Karen Quinlan represent
landmarks in the formulation and resolution of the moral and legal issues
involved with AR. For the most part, great uniformity of opinion evolved
concerning the ethical obligations regarding AR.
In applying these same principles to cases involving AHN, ethicists have had
recourse to the development that occurred in the debate over AR. Some
ethicists have based, in part, their conclusions regarding AHN on their
evaluation of the degree to which AHN should be treated as similar to or
different from AR.

a) Similarities
Authors who consider AHN and AR morally indistinguishable base their
conclusion on several factors.3 First, air is as essential to the maintenance of the
patient receiving AR as food and water are to the patient receiving AHN.
Although each of these necessities oflife is essential to any person, whether sick
or not, the individual's moral obligation to avail oneself of such necessities is
governed by the same principles applicable to the duty to seek medical
treatment. In this regard, food and water and air are similar to blood, insulin
and a properly functioning heart. Each of these is necessary for the healthy
person and for the sick person. One's duty to utilize the mans of obtaining each
such essential component of a healthy life (i.e., AHN, AR, transfusion,
injection, transplant, respectively) is evaluated in terms of the usefulness of
such means and the burdens associated with their use.
Second, both essentials oflife, food and water and air, are delivered to the
patient by artificial means made available through developments in medical
technology.
Third, in the absence of either AHN or AR, the patient will die in a relatively
short period of time. When a patient survives after the withdrawal of AR, as
Karen Quinlan did, such survival is contrary to all reasonable expectations.
Thus, from an ethical perspective, the death of the patient after the withdrawal
of AR is to be treated as foreseen with moral certitude.
Fourth, both AHN and AR are provided to bypass or circumvent a
condition of the patient which causes or results in the patient's inability to
chew or swallow, in the one case, or to breathe, in the other case. In cases of
DPU patients involving AHN, the inability to chew or swallow is caused by an
injury or defect of the brain which prevents the alimentary system, which is
otherwise intact and operable, from functioning. In cases of DPU patients
involving AR, the respiratory system itself is inoperable or insufficiently
operable to serve its normal respiratory function.
Fifth, the withdrawal of both AHN and AR can be characterized as allowing the patient to die rather than introducing a new cause of death. In
May, 1992
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both cases the patient dies from a combination of the withdrawal of AHN or
AR, as applicable, and the malfunctioning of the alimentary or respiratory, as
applicable, system. Such malfunctioning is not attributable to any action on the
part of those who withdraw the life support mechanism, but rather, to the
pre-existing injury or defect of the patient.

b) Differences
Authors who consider AHN and AR fundamentally different base their
conclusion on several factors.4 First, while AR is clearly medical treatment,
AHN is a fundamental necessity of life and, as such, is provided as basic
nursing or human care of the patient. The provision of food and water is
analogous to other acts of simple compassion and care such as turning the
patient to prevent bed sores, providing a proper room temperature and
providing for the basic hygienic needs of the patient. The mechanism for
delivering AHN, particularly in the case of a gastrostomy tube, is relatively
simple and does not raise the spectre of excessive medical technology
associated with the mechanism for delivering AR.
Second, AR generally constitutes extraordinary means, whereas AHN
constitutes ordinary means, of sustaining life. Given that AHN is utilized in
many cases involving patients who are in no sense terminal, AHN is viewed as
a relatively simple substitute for the ordinary means of sustenance provided by
food and water.
Third, the withdrawal of AHN introduces a new cause of death, namely,
dehydration and malnutrition, whereas the withdrawal of AR allows the
patient to die from an underlying condition. Questions regarding the
withdrawal of AHN have arisen most prominently in cases of DPU patients.
So long as AHN is provided, such patients are not expected to die from any
underlying illness. AR, however, is associated with cases of patients who have
incurable and un treatable conditions and who will die from such conditions
notwithstanding the provision of AR.
Fourth, AHN is a supplement whereas AR is a subsittute. The alimentary
system of DPU patients is functional and such system will perform its
biological role provided that the normal means of delivering food and water
(i.e. through the mouth) is bypassed. In cases involving the use of AR, the
patient's respiratory system is completely incapable of functioning.
Fifth, the withdrawal of AHN can have only one result - the death of the
patient; the withdrawl of AR can result in the death of the patient, but such
result is not inevitable and patients (such as Karen Quinlan) can live for years
without AR.
Sixth, the provision of food and water to a person in need, whatever the
mans used, has important symbolic significance.
Seventh, if the withdrawal of AHN from non-terminal DPU patients is
accepted, there will be no means of preventing society from accepting active
euthanasia.
50
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c) Comments
A thorough evaluation of the reasonableness of the proffered distinctions
and similarities is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the effort here is to
demonstrate that the argument for treating AHN and AR as indistinguishable
is not sufficient to support the conclusion that AHN is always morally optional
for a DPU patient.
Yet, such argument is made. Some of those who maintain that AHN is
always morally optional frame the argument as follows :
The provision of AR for a DPU patient is always morally optional.
AHN and AR are morally and medically indistinguishable.
Therefore, the provision of AHN for a DPU patient is always morally optional.5

The argument contains at least on~ significant flaw. Even if one grants, for
purpose of the argument, the validity of the minor premise, the validity of the
major premise is questionable. The "general view" that AR for a DPU patient
is always morally optional needs to be reassessed because it provides a
significant foundation for the conclusion regarding AHN.
To that end, the cases of Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan are reviewed as
vehicles for the exploration of the ethics of withholding 6 AHN and AR from
DPU patients.

3. Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan
a) Quinlan
On April 15, 1975 Karen Quinlan was involved in an automobile accident
in which she sustained numerous injuries. 7 The length of time she was without
spontaneous respiration is unknown. Upon arrival at the hospital, medical
personnel diagnosed her as being in a coma. She remained in this state for a
period of time, after which time she entered a persistent vegetative state.
Ms. Quinlan's father sought to be appointed Karen's guardian with legal
authority to direct the removal of her respirator. The New Jersey Supreme
Court granted Mr. Quinlan's petition.
The New Jersey Supreme Court described Ms. Quinlan's condition as
irreversible and terminal, with death being imminent. The court viewed Karen
as having no reasonable "possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life."8
Based on the unanimous view of her physicians, the court stated that Karen
would die in less than a year even with continued use of the respirator and that
removal of the respirator would result in her death in a matter of minutes. In
effect, the court viewed the respirator as prolonging the biological life of
someone waiting to die. 9
According to the court, the cause of Ms. Quinlan'S terminal condition was
her inability to breathe without the aid of the respirator. This inability was due
to a "lesion on the cerebral hemispheres and a lesion in the brain stem." Based
on this understanding, the court concluded that ccntinued use ofthe respirator
would constitute extraordinary means in that the treatment was
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futile.10
Bishop Lawrence Casey, the Bishop of Paterson (the diocese in which the
Quinlans resided), submitted a statement to the court in which he applied
Church teaching to Ms. Quinlan's case. I I Bishop Casey reviewed the principles
set forth in Pope Pius XII's address to anesthesiologists concerning the use of
artificial resperators. In that address, Pope Pius concluded that in the case of a
person "in a state of deep unconsciousness" where "only automatic artificial
resperation is keeping [the patient] alive" and where "the soul may already left
the body", the use of a respirator was morally optional. 12 Bishop Casey
expressly rejected euthanasia and defined euthanasia to include the causing of
the death of a patient who is "deemed unable to live a so-called meaningful
life." 13
Bishop Casey viewed Miss Quinlan'S condition as hopeless in that she had
"no reasonable hope of recovery from her comatose state". He concluded that
in such circumstances continued use of the respirator constituted extraordinary
means and, therefore, was morally optional. There is no evidence from Bishop
Casey's statement that he considered use of the respirator unduly burdensome.
Rather, his conclusion seemed to be based on the judgment that her coma
constituted a terminal condition and that continued use of the respirator was
useless in that it was prolonging her dying.14
Leading theologians shared Bishop Casey's conclusions. Paul Ramsey and
William May, for example, viewed Karen Quinlan as terminal and the
continued use of the respirator as useless. They justified its removal on that
specific ground. 15
b) Cruzan

Nancy Cruzan was injured in an automobile accident on January 11,
1983. 16 After her accident, she continued to exhibit brain stem activity and,
thus, continued to breathe on her own without the aid of a respirator, but
experienced damage to all other areas of the brain, including those areas which
control swallowing and chewing.
At the time of the proceedings, she was unconscious, though no longer in a
coma, unresponsive to her environment, except for reflexive responses to
sound and perhaps to painful stimuli, and was a spastic quadraplegic. Her
blood pressure was normal, her pulse was regular and her respiration was
spontaneous. She had severe, irreversible upper hemispheric brain damage
with progressive degeneration of the brain. Her condition was considered
permanent. She received nutrition and hydration through a gastrostomy tube
which had been surgically implanted. The experts agreed that she had no
condition which would cause her death and that, if AHN was provided, she
could continue to live for thirty years. The entire cost of her care was paid for
by the State of Missouri. 17
c) Quinlan and Cruzan

Many similarities exist between the cases of Karen Quinlan and Nancy
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Cruzan. Some of the similarities in the physical condition of both patients have
led authors to conclude that the cases are indistinguishable morally. Those
who maintain this view focus on the hopelessness of the conditions.
Many of those who supported the decisions of the Quinlans and the Cruzans
to seek withdrawal of life support measures did so on the ground that
continued use of such measures was futile. In the Quinlan case, the parties
based their conclusion on a belief that Karen was terminal, whereas in the
Cruzan case, certain parties viewed Nancy as terminal (or dying) under an
expanded definition of such term.
Since the notions ofterminal and futile played such an important role in the
analysis of the Quinlan and Cruzan cases, a reassessment of these terms is
warranted. This reassessment begins with an analysis of the meaning of
terminal in the Quinlan case and the grounds for the conclusion that AR was
useless in her case. This review is followed by a similar analysis of the Cruzan
case. Following these analyses, the burdensomeness of AHN and AR will be
assessed.

4. Effectiveness: Principles and Application of Principles
a) Quinlan
The record in the Quinlan case reflects the confusion evident at the time in
the understanding of Karen's condition. Initially, Karen's father sought an
order declaring her brain dead. Both the lower court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court consistently referred to Karen as being in an irreversible coma,
notwithstanding that the medical experts, for the most part, described Karen as
being in a persistent vegetative state. 18 Bishop Casey described Karen as being
in a coma, as did Prof. Ramsey.19
This confusion was not surprising; the medical community at the time had
not agreed upon uniform terminology for describing the various conditions:
Beginning in the 1970's, however, neurological specialists began using the same term
to apply to patients in the persistent vegetative state, such as Karen Quinlan. Thus,
some physicians would use "irreversible coma" to mean brain death while others
would use it to mean the persistent vegetative state. Even today, physicians use the
term "irreversible coma" in at least three different ways: whole brain death, persistent
vegetative state, or as a general term for all types of permanently unconscious
patients.20

Based on the testimony of the medical experts, Karen was not, at the time of
the trial, in a coma, but rather, was in a persistent vegetative state. The
difference is significant:
[Coma] [p]atients ... often have impaired cough, gag, and swallowing reflexes with a
resultant inability (involuntary) to clear the passages of the throat and lungs. This
impairment leads to frequent, often fatal, respiratory infections - a common cause of
death in comatose patients, and one of the major reasons why truly comatose patients
typically do not experience the long-term survival period associated with the
vegetative state. Thus, in one sense it is reasonable to describe comatose patients as
"terminally ill," with death anticipated in six months to a year , unless
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extremely vigorous therapeutic efforts are made to sustain life. 21

The confusion over an accurate understanding of Karen's condition seems to
have had a significant influence on the ethical analysis.
In hindsight, we now know that Ms. Quinlan had no underlying condition
which would have resulted in her death in a relatively short period of time if
treatment was provided. Her condition made her susceptible to deadly
infections and use of the respirator increased her vulnerability. But, such
conditions, when they arose, could be treated. 22
Karen Quinlan lived for nine years after the respirator was removed. 23
Karen Quinlan, and patients like her, are not terminal or dying, unless such
terms are used in an unconventional way. A patient in Karen's condition is
terminal if by terminal one means that there is no hope of recovery from the
neurological damage sustained. 24 Treatment is futile for such patient in that life
support measures are ineffective in restoring the patient to a certain level of
cognitive functioning.
But, the purpose of life-sustaining treatments is to sustain the life of the
patient, not to reverse neurological damage or restore cognitive functioning.
As such, the use of life-sustaining treatments, such as AR or AHN, for a
nondying DPU patient, is generally effective and useful in achieving the
purpose of such treatments.
Two additional observations can be made with respect to the Quinlan case.
First, on the basis of what we know now, continued use of the respirator was
unnecessary to the maintenance of Karen's life; after the respirator was
removed, Karen continued to breathe on her own for nine years. Thus, a
decision to remove the respirator could have been made on the ground of its
uselessness. The respirator was useless in that it did not contribute to
maintaining Karen's life, not in that Karen's life was not worth maintaining.
Second, the basis for such decision is different from the grounds advanced at
the time to justify removal of the respirator. At the time, those involved
considered continued use of the respirator useless on two grounds: (1) that
Karen would have died in a relatively short period of time even ifthe respirator
were continued and (2) that the respirator could not restore Karen's life to a
meaningful existence. The first ground turned out to be factually incorrect. The
second ground is an unacceptable basis for a determination that life sustaining
treatment is futile in that it requires such treatment to achieve an end which
such treatment is neither designed nor intended to achieve.

b) Cruzan
The conditiori of Nancy Cruzan was such that, with treatment, she could
have lived for thirty years. She, too, was not terminal or dying, in any
customary sense of such terms. The provision of AHN to Nancy Cruzan was
useless only in the sense that AHN would not cure or treat the injury to
her brain and, therefore, would not improve her level of cognitive
54
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functioning. The arguments set forth above against the reasonableness of such
use of the terms terminal and useful are applicable with equal force to the
Cruzan case.

5. Burden
a) Principles
The decision to discontinue the respirator in Karen Quinlan's case has also
been justified on the ground of burden. Continued use of a respirator may be
morally optional if it is unduly burdensome, whether or not the patient is
terminal. Fr. lohn Connery, S.l. did not view Karen's condition as terminal. He
considered the initial use of the respirator in her case to constitute ordinary
means. 25 However, continued use of the respirator over a long period of time
made it excessively burdensome:
[Al)though procedures of this kind [giving oxygen, IV feeding, blood transfusions)
would not be classified as extraordinary on a short term basis, e.g., to pull a patient
through a crisis, if they had to become a way oflife, even today they would fall into this
class, e.g., long term or permanent use of an artificial respirator. The burden of such use
could make them intolerable.26

The burdensome nature of the treatment places a limit on one's duty to
preserve life or health. A patient may decide to forego treatment on the basis of
burden provided that the patient's intention is to avoid or relieve the burden,
rather than to shorten one's life. 27 In order for a decision to reflect a choice to
remove a burden rather than to shorten one's life, the treatment involved must
be burdensome.
A treatment can be burdensome in several ways. A treatment may be
burdensome to the patient if it is a burden to the patient, to the patient's family or
to society.28 A treatment may be burdensome if it imposes emotional, financial,
psychologicai or physiological hardships. The assessment of burden may also
involve a weighing of the pain or expense of the treatment in relation to the
prospective benefit which the treatment offers. 29 The reasonableness of one's
judgment regarding burden will depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case and the type of life support treatment involved.
In the case of a conscious person, competent or incompetent, long-term use of
life-sustaining treatments ~y be judged excessively burdensome on several
grounds: cost of the treatment to the patient or his family, painfulness of the
treatment to the patient, impairment of activity due to the treatment,
psychological pain to the patient or his family, disruption to the lives offamily
members and distraction from attention to other important tasks or
disproportion between the effort (use ofresources, personnel, cost) involved in
providing the treatment and the benefits to the patient. 30
The analysis of burden in the case of a DPU patient is further complicated by
the condition of the patient. When the patient is diagnosed as permanently
unconscious, caution must be exercised in determining whether the aspects of
treatment that were burdensome to a conscious patient (competent
May, 1992
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or incompetent) are also burdensome to an unconscious patient. This caution
is warranted not because a patient loses rights when he becomes unconscious
(he doesn't), but rather, because the basis for the conclusion that the treatment
is burdensome may have been removed when the patient lost consciousness.
In the case of a OPU patient, it is difficult to argue that the patient
experiences any burden associated with treatment, other than financial
hardships in certain cases. 3 1 OPU patients most probably do not experience
pain or any emotional or intellectual distress. Treatment of OPU patients
imposes no restrictions on liberty not already present due to the patient's
condition. While the benefits reasonably to be expected from continued
treatment are minimal, the burdens, to the patient, associated with such
treatment may be virtually nonexistent.
The care of a OPU patient may be burdensome to the patient's family. The
assessment of burden to the patient's family involves a review of many of the
same factors which are relevant to the analysis of burden in the case of a
conscious patient.
However, many times, burdens experienced by family members relate to the
condition of the patient rather than the treatment. 32 The experience of family
members seeing a loved one in a state of severe disability is extremely painful.
But the discontinuation of treatment would not relieve the family's burden.
That relief would come only with the death of the patient. But to seek the death
of the patient is to choose death, not to remove the burden of treatment.
Furthermore, although the burdens associated with the patient's condition
may be real and quite painful, generally, in the absence of a clear expression of
the patient's wishes, they are not advanced as the reason for the
disGontinuation of treatment. More typically, the rationale is to the effect that
the patient would not want to live under such circumstances.
b) Application of Principles

Based on the analysis outlined above we can apply such principles to the
cases of Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan.
If Karen were conscious, removal of the respirator could have been justified
on the basis of burden to the patient. The burdensomeness of the treatment
consisted not only in the use of the respirator, but also the hardships associated
with intensive care. 33
But Karen Ann Quinlan was unconscious. She did not, to the best of our
knowledge, experience the hardship associated with the respirator and
intensive care. What aspects of her treatment were burdensome in her
condition?
Germain Grisez identifies two factors that made Karen Quinlan's
treatment burdensome: the cost of intensive care and the psychological
burden to her parents who thought that the respirator was painful to Karen. 34
While the cost of ICU and the respirator was expensive and, as such, would
constitute a financial burden if such costs were born by the
S6
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patient or the family, Karen's mother testified that the family did not bear such
COSt. 35 Thus, the ground of expense (to the patient or the family) is not
sustainable in the Quinlan case.
The psychological burden to Karen's parents was real, whether or not Karen
experienced pain, because they thought the respirator troubled her. This
distress on the part of the family was distinct from and in addition to the pain
associated with Karen's condition. Thus, it provides a legitimate basis for a
determination of burden to the family. There is no evidence, however, that
Karen would have decided to discontinue treatment for this reason or that the
decision of her parents was actually made on this basis. 36 Further, to the extent
that neurologists convincingly demonstrate that DPU patients do not
experience any pain, the psychological burden to the family can be mitigated.
Thus, removal of the respirator could not be justified in the Quinlan case on
the basis of burden to Karen (without consideration of the effects of the
treatment on family or society). The treatment was not painful to her, either
emotionally or physically, it was not financially burdensome and it did not
restrict her liberty. The treatment was not disproportionate in that even though
the benefits were minimal, there was no burden to her in continuing the
treatment.
Continued use of the respirator could constitute grounds for a determination
of burden to the family to the extent that the respirator, as opposed to Karen's
condition of severe disability, caused psychological pain to her family. The
evidence does not indicate that pain to the family was the basis for the family's
decision.
Based upon the above conclusions regarding continued use of the respirator,
we must next consider AHN. We can explore the question of whether AHN is
morally optional for a patient in Karen Quinlan's condition by looking at
Nancy Cruzan's case. Nancy Cruzan, in a sense 37 , is Karen Quinlan after the
respirator was removed.
Removal of AHN from Nancy cannot be justified on the ground of burden
to Nancy (without consideration of the effects of treatment on the family or
society). Given Nancy's condition, the provision of AHN was not painful to
her in any emtional, physical or psychological sense. The treatment was not
economically burdensome since the cost was paid for entirely by the state.
Given the absence of any other burdens and the minimal benefit treatment
provided, the provision of AHN was not disproportionate.
Nancy's family certainly bore the pain associated with attending to Nancy
in her state of severe disability. But that pain was caused by Nancy's
condition. There is no evidence that the treatment itself caused the family
distress. In fact, in the Missouri lower court proceeding which authorized the
discontinuation of AHN for Nancy, the doctors recommended that the
gastrostomy tube be left in place after AHN was discontinued so as to
facilitate the provision of medications. 38 If Nancy were alert, responsive and
interacting with her family on an intellectual and emotional level, there
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is little doubt that the family would have sought to continue the very same
treatment they sought to discontinue. Nancy's condition was distressing; but to
alleviate Nancy's condition by eliminating Nancy is to remove the burden of
Nancy, not the burden of treatment.

6. Conclusion
Recent cases involving DPU patients have forced ethicists to revisit the
ethics of prolonging life and to analyze more closely the meaning of the terms
useless and burden.
In considering the ethical obligations surrounding AHN, many ethicists
have analyzed the issue by comparing AHN with AR. Such effort has resulted
in a conclusion by some authors that AHN and AR are essentially the same
while other authors have come to the opposite conclusion. Ethicists on both
sides of the issue, however, seem to begin with the premise that AR in such
circumstances is always morally optional.
The "general impression" concerning AR developed in great part in
response to the circumstances surrounding the Karen Quinlan case.
A review of the Quinlan case, however, shows that it does not support the
proposition that AR is always morally optional for a nondying DPU patient.
The conclusion reached by many at the time, that AR was morally optional on
the ground of futility, was based on a combination of an incorrect
understanding of Ms. Quinlan's medical condition and an unacceptable
understanding of the meaning of usefulness. The record in the case shows that
Karen was not a coma patient in imminent danger of death, but rather, was a
nondying DPU patient who, like other nondying DPU patients, had no
reasonable prospect of regaining cognitive functioning.
Thus, the use oflife-sustaining treatments for such nondying DPU patients is
generally effective and useful in achieving the purpose of such treatment.
However, the provision of AR for Karen was useless in the sense that it was
unnecessary for the conservation of Karen's life.
Moreover, the Quinlan case does not support the conclusion that AR is
always morally optional on the basis of burden. While burden can be
established in the Quinlan case, it rests on the particular circumstances of that
case (e.g., emotional pain to the patient's family who thought the respirator
was painful to Karen). The more common ground for demonstrating the
burden of treatment, that is, burden to the patient, is not established by the
Quinlan case.
The analysis of the effectiveness and burdensome ness of life sustaining
treatment in the Quinlan case applies to the Cruzan case. Nancy Cruzan had no
underlying condition which, if treated, would have resulted in her death. She
was not terminal and the provision of AHN was effective in conserving her life.
The provision of AHN to Nancy did not constitute a burden to her or her
family.
Thus, even if it can be convincingly demonstrated that AHN and AR are
morally and medically indistinguishable in cases of nondying DPU
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patients, it does not follow that AHN is always morally optional in such cases
because it has not been demonstrated that AR is always morally optional in
such cases.
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Harmon, 760 S.w. 2d 408 (Mo. banc 1988); Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321 , 486 A. 2d 1209,
1228 (198S).
10. In Re Quinlan, op. cit. at 48.
11 . Bishop Casey's statement is contained in Quinlan and Quinlan, Karen Ann: The
Quinlan 's Tell Their Story (New York: Bantam Books, 1977), 309-18.
12. Pope Pius XII's Address to the Congress of the Italian Anesthesiological Society, on
February 24, 19S7, reproin Horan, Dennis J. and David Mall, ed. Death, Dying and Euthanasia
(Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1977), p. 281.
13. Bishop Casey, op. cit at 311.
14. The sources cited by Bishop Casey with terminal coma patients and the justification for
foregoing extraordinary means on the grounds of both uselessness and burden, including burden
to the family. See Pope Pius XII's address, op. cit.; Kelly, Gerald, S.J ., "The Duty to Preserve
Life", Theological Studies, 12 (19SI), pp. SSOff.
IS. May, William E., Human Existence, Medicine and Ethics: Reflections on Human Life
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